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ii. 
I. 
UTAH STATE AUTHORITIES RELINQUISHED PRIMARY 
CUSTODY OF MR. SWENSON ON SEPTEMBER 12, 2006, AT 
WHICH TIME PRIMARY CUSTODY BELONGED TO FEDERAL 
AUTHORITIES. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS IN FEDERAL CUSTODY 
Ordinarily, the first sovereign to arrest an offender has priority of jurisdiction for 
purposes of trial, sentencing and incarceration until that priority is relinquished by, "for 
example, bail release, dismissal of charges, parole release or expiration of sentence." 
Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 444 (9th cir. 1998):.Hubbert v. Ebbert, Civil No. 4:CV-09-
0243 (M.D. Pa. 6-10-2009), HERAS V. EBBERT, Civil No.:CV-09-00494 (M.D. Pa. 5-
11-2009) RUDOLPH V. HOLT, Civil No: l:CV-08-00340 (M.D. Pa. 5-11-2009) 
In this case, Mr. Swenson was released by state authorities on bail not once, 
but twice. When the state Court re-instated bail on September 12, 2006, Mr. 
Swenson was released from the State of Utah's primary custody and because of a 
U.S. Marshall's detainer in the primary custody of the Federal Government. Mr. 
Swenson inquired to the jail as to why he was not being released from jail and the 
Cache County Jail Division indicated there was a U.S. Marshall's detainer, (see 
exhibit A) The State of Utah no longer had primary custody over Mr. Swenson. 
The appellee would have the court believe that defendant remained in 
State's custody even though it is clear that after the posting of bail, the state loses 
its primary custody, id. The defendant is now in Federal Custody. The only thing 
hold Mr. Swenson after he posts bail is the Federal Detainer. The appropriate 
mechanism to return him into State's custody is for the State of Utah to file a writ 
of Habeas Corpus prosequendum. The State failed to file their "Writ". 
Therefore everything the State court did to Mr. Swenson was just an illusion. He 
wasn't in their custody. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
The act of the police officer entering the vehicle was clearly a violation of 
Mr. Swenson's Fourth Amendment rights. The police officer should have sought 
a warrant before proceeding to search Mr. Swenson's vehicle. See Maryland 
v.Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1995) (citing California v. Conway, 411 U.S. 386, 
390-91 (1985). Furthermore the automobile exception does not apply. If a car is 
readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the 
Fourth Amendment permits police to search the vehicle without more. 
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996). The exception is based on the 
automobile's ready mobility and second on the individuals reduced expectation of 
privacy in an automobile. Labron, 518 U.S. at 940. 
The police officer saw some tools at the store. However, he did not know until 
he had entered into the store and saw that ATM machine had been sawed into that this 
had anything to do with the case. This was after the defendant was arrested The gas 
powered chop saw the officer saw through the window had no significance at the time. 
R349:21,22 He had not entered the store yet. 
2 
The appellee suggest in his brief numerous wCmaybe scenarios" as to what was 
going through Officer's Hansen's mind in the night in question. However none of these 
"maybe scenarios" are stated by Officer Hansen in the trial or the preliminary hearing or 
motion hearing. Maybe the thoughts of Officer Hansen articulated on the record would 
provide the Court with reliable evidence to justify probable cause. Absent a statement by 
Officer Hansen the court should conclude his actions did not rise to the level of probable 
cause. 
Furthermore the police should not have searched Mr. Swenson's vehicle incident 
to his arrest on the outstanding warrant. In the recent decision of the United Supreme 
Court in the case of Arizona v. Gant No 07-542 566 U.S. (2009) the Court held the 
police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident of a recent occupant's 
arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the 
time of the search or the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Id. Mr. 
Swenson could not access the vehicle at the time of search and the only evidence that 
might suggest that the truck contained some evidence of the crime is the gas-powered 
chop saw. However this was observed during the Officer's initial illegal search of the 
vehicle. Nothing was removed from the store. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant posted bail on his state cases and should have been released from 
jail or transported to a hold facility of the federal inmates. Cache County jail has a 
contract to hold Federal inmates. The Cache County jail informed the defendant the he 
was being held on this Federal detainer. The state lost primary custody of the defendant 
when he posted bail on is state charges. In order to return the defendant to the primary 
3 
custody of the State of Utah they need to file a writ of Habeas Corpus 
prosequendum. They failed to do so. The State of Utah failed use the proper 
mechanism to bring the defendant to State court. 
The search of the defendant's truck was illegal. The officer in essence 
entered the vehicle when he put his arm and flashlight into the vehicle without 
probable cause and without a search warrant. None of the exceptions to the search 
warrant requirement are met. Therefore the Court should order that all evidence 
obtained as a result of the officer's illegal entry into the vehicle should be 
suppressed and he be granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this _ day of June, 2009. 
M* 
David M. Peroy / 
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United States 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Reports 
TAYLOR v. RENO, 164 F.3d 440 (9th Cir. 1998) 
MIGUEL TAYLOR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JANET RENO, Attorney General; 
KATHLEEN HAWK, Director of Bureau of Prisons; EDUARDO GONZALES, 
Director U.S. Marshal Service, Respondents-Appellees. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MIGUEL TAYLOR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Nos. 97-36198, 98-35013 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 
Argued and Submitted November 6, 1998 — Portland, Oregon 
Filed December 31, 1998 
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COUNSEL 
Steven T. Wax, Federal Public Defender's Office, Portland, 
Oregon, for the petitioner-appellant. 
Michael J. Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, Portland, 
Oregon, for the respondent-appellee. 
Appeals from the United States District Court for the 
District of Oregon Malcolm F. Marsh, District Judge, Presiding. 
D.C. No. CV-97-00592-MFM & D.C. No. CV-97-00593-MFM. 
Before: David R. Thompson and Stephen S. Trott, Circuit 
Judges, and John S. Rhoades, Sr., District Judge, [fn*] 
[fn*] Honorable John S. Rhoades, Sr., United States District Court Judge 
for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation. 
[1] OPINION 
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. 
[2] The appellant Miguel Taylor ("Taylor") was sentenced to three 
consecutive 70-month terms of imprisonment by the United States 
District Court for his drug convictions in this case. He was also 
sentenced by the Oregon State Court to 115 months for a 
manslaughter conviction. In this appeal from the denial of his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 
U + + ~ . / / « ~ ™ T I~:~I. 
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and from the denial of his motion for a reduction of his sentence 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Taylor challenges the district 
court's refusal to transfer his custody from the State of Oregon 
to the Federal Bureau of Prisons so that his federal sentence 
would commence. He also 
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challenges the district court's refusal to give him credit against his 
federal sentence for the time he has served and will serve in state custody. 
[3] Taylor contends that his federal sentence should have 
commenced prior to his state sentence because the federal 
government had primary jurisdiction over him when it imposed his 
federal sentence. He also argues that the district court's 
judgment and commitment order mandated that the United States 
Marshal ("Marshal") deliver him into federal custody, and the 
Marshal failed to do so. Taylor further argues that he received 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel when his 
attorney informed him that his federal sentence would begin when 
the district court's commitment order was entered. Finally, he 
contends that statements about his custodial status made by the 
district judge during sentencing about his custodial status 
lulled him into relying on erroneous advice of his counsel, 
thereby denying him due process. 
[4] We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §JL291 and 
2253, and we affirm. 
FACTS 
[5] In June 1992, Taylor was charged in federal court with 
conspiracy to distribute and distribution of crack cocaine. 
Approximately two weeks after his arrest, Taylor was released on 
his own recognizance. On October 27, 1992, Taylor pleaded guilty 
to three federal counts of distributing crack cocaine. Taylor 
remained released on his own recognizance pending sentencing. 
[6] While he was on release awaiting sentencing, state officials arrested 
him on December 14, 1992, charged him with murder, and jailed him. 
[7] Back in federal court, the district court set March 29, 1993 
as the date for a hearing on Taylor's objections to his 
presentence report and on his motion to continue his federal 
sentencing hearing. On the March 29th date, pursuant to a writ of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum, state officials produced Taylor at 
the United States District Court. During the hearing, the 
district judge expressed concern about the delay in sentencing: 
"[Taylor] is sitting in jail on state charges not giving him 
credit towards a federal charge. . . . [H]e is serving a term as 
far as I am concerned he should get credit for. I don't have the 
power to do this as long as he is in state custody." 
[8] The district judge continued the sentencing to May 10, 1993, 
at which time Taylor appeared for federal sentencing without the 
issuance of a new writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The 
original writ required Taylor's presence for federal court 
sentencing on March 29, 1993, and for "such further proceedings 
as may be directed by the Court." 
[9] At the May 10, 1993 sentencing hearing, Taylor was sentenced 
n / ^ r » n / ^ o n / O / ^ ^ I 7 ^ m - | 0 / . ^ r ? 1 A/14-T7 1A+0/*?> 6 / 9 Q / 7 0 0 9 
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to three concurrent terms of 70 months. His defense counsel 
raised the issue of whether Taylor would be granted federal 
credit for time that he served in state custody. Responding to 
that concern, the district judge stated: 
"I will recommend [that Taylor be sent to] the Federal 
Corrections Institute at Sheridan. [Taylor] will be sentenced to 
the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. I also considered that with 
the imposition of this sentence you are now in federal custody. I 
also feel that you are entitled to the credit for time that you 
were in custody from the time of your release until the time of 
the State arrest. However, you must be aware of the fact that the 
original determination of all credit for time served is made by 
the Bureau of Prisons. If it abuses its discretion or violates 
the law, that can be reviewed by a District Court. So my 
statements of what I feel you are entitled may meet with some 
resistance but those are the recommendations that I am making." 
[10] The district judge's written order specifically stated, 
"[w]ith the imposition of this sentence, the defendant is now in 
federal custody. The court recommends that the defendant be 
given credit for time served from the time of arrest on the 
federal charges until his release on federal charges." The order 
also contained language that Taylor was "hereby committed to the 
custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons." At the conclusion of 
the May 10, 1993 sentencing hearing, 
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the Marshal returned Taylor to the county detention center, where he was 
held as a state prisoner. 
[11] Taylor was subsequently acquitted on the state murder charge, 
but he was convicted of manslaughter. His manslaughter conviction 
was reversed on appeal, he was retried for manslaughter and once 
again convicted. The state court sentenced him to 115 months in 
state prison, gave him credit for the time he had served in state 
custody, and ordered that his state sentence run concurrently 
with his previously imposed 70-month federal sentence. Ever since 
Taylor's first conviction on the state manslaughter charge he has 
been serving his state sentence in the custody of the Oregon 
Department of Corrections. 
[12] Following the imposition of Taylor's state sentence, the 
Bureau of Prisons refused to take custody of him and opted not to 
begin running his federal sentence until he completed his state 
sentence. The Bureau of Prisons advised Taylor, however, that it 
would be willing to designate the Oregon prison as the site for 
service of his federal sentence, thereby producing concurrent 
federal and state sentences, if the federal district court 
recommended it. The district court refused to make that 
recommendation. In refusing to do so, the district court referred 
to the fact that the imposition of concurrent state and federal 
sentences would render the 70-month federal drug trafficking 
sentences a nullity and that permitting Taylor to "trade" his 
concurrent federal drug sentences for the 115 month state 
manslaughter sentence would be unconscionable. Thus, Taylor 
continues to serve his state sentence in state custody; his 
federal sentence has not yet commenced. 
[13] Taylor filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 
28 U.S.C.§ 2241 and a motion for reduction of his federal 
\^4+^. .11 1 _ * _1 / / J _ ' 1_x_0_ _ n/^nn/Ann/^/-^TTT/-vr»rvA/^n< yj . T~K ^ i . n s ~. 
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sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court 
denied relief, and this appeal followed. 
[14] We must first determine whether the state or federal 
government had primary jurisdiction[fnl] over Taylor at the time 
his federal sentence was imposed on May 10, 1993. Taylor argues 
that the federal government had primary jurisdiction over him at 
that time because his federal custody continued while he was on 
release awaiting federal sentencing. In the alternative, Taylor 
contends that if the federal government relinquished primary 
jurisdiction over him when he was released awaiting his federal 
sentencing, the federal government regained primary jurisdiction 
when the state delivered him to federal court for the May 10, 
1993 sentencing hearing, without a new writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum. Because the federal government had primary 
jurisdiction over him at that time, Taylor argues, his federal 
sentence commenced before imposition of his state sentence. 
[15] While the federal government undoubtedly had primary 
jurisdiction over Taylor before it released him on his own 
recognizance, the question is whether this release relinquished 
federal primary jurisdiction. We conclude that it did. As a 
result, the state obtained primary jurisdiction over Taylor when 
it arrested him on the state murder charge. Further, because 
Taylor appeared pursuant to a valid writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum, he was still in state custody when he was delivered 
to the federal court for the March 29, 1993 hearing and for the 
May 10, 1993 sentencing. Because he was still in state custody at 
the time the district court imposed Taylor's federal sentence, 
the district court did not have authority to order Taylor into 
federal custody to commence his federal sentence. 
[16] We reach this conclusion mindful of a split among the 
circuits on the issue of whether releasing a defendant on bail 
relinquishes primary jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit, in United 
States v. Croft, 450 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1971), held that when a 
defendant is charged with a federal offense and released on bail, 
the federal government does not lose its primary jurisdiction. To 
the contrary, the 
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Second Circuit in Roche v. Sizer, 675 F.2d 507 
(2d Cir. 1982), held that primary jurisdiction passes to the 
state when a defendant posts bond on federal charges and is 
subsequently arrested by the state. The facts of both cases are 
almost identical to those before us. 
[17] Ninth Circuit precedent leads us to the Second Circuit's 
position that the federal government relinquished its custody and 
primary jurisdiction when it released Taylor on his own 
recognizance. In Strand v. Schmittroth, 251 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 
1957), we held that the federal government gave up primary 
jurisdiction when it released a sentenced prisoner on probation 
and the prisoner was later arrested on state charges. Strand 
relied largely on the state's physical possession of the 
defendant. Id. at 606. As in Strand, the state in this case, not 
the federal government, maintained physical possession of Taylor. 
"The sovereign who lacks possession of the body 'permits' another 
to proceed against the accused. . . . " Id. 
[18] Although not directly addressing the question of primary 
r- lnir\ ir\f\{\(\ 
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jurisdiction, Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371 (9th Cir. 1996), 
decided more recently, also supports the proposition that the 
federal government relinquished primary jurisdiction over Taylor 
when it released him on his own recognizance. The defendant in 
Clark was convicted in federal court (as opposed to only being 
charged) and then released on bail pending appeal. Id. at 372. 
While on release, the state arrested and convicted him. Id. The 
federal court then revoked the probation portion of Clark's 
sentence. Id. On appeal, we determined that Clark was properly 
returned to state custody after the revocation of his federal 
probation. Id. at 373. The necessary implication of this holding 
is that the state's jurisdiction became primary when it arrested 
Clark while he was on bail pending appeal of his federal conviction. 
[19] We hold that the federal government lost its primary jurisdiction 
over Taylor when it released him on his own recognizance. The state 
then gained primary jurisdiction over him when it arrested him and 
took him into custody on the state murder charge. 
[20] The question we next consider is whether the state ceded its 
primary jurisdiction to the federal government when it permitted 
the Marshal to take Taylor to federal court for the sentencing 
hearing on May 10, 1993 without a new writ of ad prosequendum. 
Taylor argues that the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum 
— which directed the Marshal to deliver him to the federal 
court on March 29, 1993, "for the purpose of sentencing and for 
such further proceedings as may be directed by the Court" — 
did not cover his subsequent return to federal court on May 10, 1993. 
[21] We are unpersuaded by this argument. In Thomas v. Brewster, 
923 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1991), we determined that a writ of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum, which ordered a defendant who was 
held in state custody to be produced for sentencing in federal 
court on a specific date "and also at such other times as may be 
ordered by the said court," was sufficient to support the 
delivery of the defendant to federal court on a later date 
without interrupting the state's priority of jurisdiction. Id. 
at 1365. The Thomas writ is not meaningfully different from the 
writ issued here. In both cases, the writs' breadth allowed for 
producing the defendant for future, unspecified proceedings. 
Thus, Taylor was properly delivered to the district court for 
sentencing on May 10, 1993 under the earlier writ ad prosequendum 
and the state retained its primary jurisdiction. Because the 
state retained primary jurisdiction, the district court did not 
have the authority to place Taylor into federal custody for the 
purpose of commencing his federal sentence. 
[22] Taylor next argues the district judge's written and oral 
statements, that, with the imposition of the federal sentence 
Taylor was "now in federal custody," were pronouncements 
commencing Taylor's federal sentence. We disagree. A federal 
sentence commences "on the date the defendant is received in 
custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives . . . at, the 
official detention facility at which the sentence is to be 
served," 18 U.S.C. § 3585, not when sentence is imposed. Any 
statement by the court prescribing when a sentence will begin to 
run is mere surplusage. See Scott v. United 
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States, 434 F.2d 11, 21 (5th Cir. 1970). The district court did not 
have the power to commence Taylor's federal sentence, regardless of whether 
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the court intended to do so and regardless of what the court said. 
[23] Taylor argues that the Marshal disobeyed the district court's 
commitment order, which order he construes as directing his 
immediate delivery to the Bureau of Prisons for commencement of 
his federal sentence. We need not address this argument, because, 
as we have said, the district court lacked authority to order the 
commencement of Taylor's sentence. 
[24] Taylor also asserts a due process argument. He contends that 
the district judge's comments at the March 29 and May 10 hearings 
violated his due process rights because (1) they lulled him into 
relying on the erroneous advice of counsel and (2) they were 
fundamentally unfair. Because we determine that the proceedings 
were not rendered so fundamentally unfair as to violate 
constitutional due process, we reject both arguments. 
[25] In his affidavit, Taylor's attorney stated that he believed 
Taylor would get credit on his federal sentence from the day of 
federal sentencing forward based partially on the court's 
expressed concern that Taylor was at the time receiving no credit 
against his federal sentence. Taylor's lawyer relied on the 
following statement by the district judge at the March 29 hearing: 
"I have got a young man here [Taylor] that we are delaying with 
— he is sitting in jail on state charges not giving him 
credit towards a federal charge. I have got a man who has come 
forward quickly . . . and now we are sitting around delaying this 
sentencing, and he is serving a term as far as I am concerned he 
should get credit for. I don't have the power to do this as long 
as he is in state custody." 
[26] Taylor's spin on this statement is not justified. The 
district judge clearly states that he cannot give Taylor federal 
credit while Taylor is in state custody. Furthermore, the 
district judge's concern does not equal a promise to start 
running Taylor's federal sentence from the date of his federal 
sentencing. The statement is more properly construed, as the 
district court later noted, as a concern that Taylor receive 
credit for time served from the date of his federal sentencing 
until the resolution of his state case rather than a declaration 
of when Taylor's federal sentence commences. And in any event, 
statements by a district court regarding credit for time served 
are only recommendations. See United States v. Wilson, 
503 U.S. 329. 333 (1992). 
[27] Taylor also points to the following comment of the district 
judge at the May 10 hearing: "I also considered that with the 
imposition of this sentence you are in federal custody." But here, 
the district judge specifies his concern, stating the following: 
"I also feel that you are entitled to the credit for the time 
that you were in custody from the time of your release until the 
State arrest. However, you must be made aware of the fact that 
the original determination of all credit for time served is made 
by the Bureau of Prisons. . . . [M]y statements of what you are 
entitled to may meet with some resistance but those are the 
recommendations that I am making." (Emphasis added.) 
[28] Once again, the second part of the court's statement makes 
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clear that (1) the district judge could not guarantee Taylor 
federal credit and (2) it is not a declaration of the 
commencement of Taylor's federal sentence. 
[29] In contending that the district court hearings were so 
fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the 
Constitution, Taylor relies on United States v. Neely, 38 F.3d 458 
(9th Cir. 1994). Neely held that a district court cannot 
accept a defendant's guilty plea without informing him that his 
federal sentence could be served consecutively to a pending state 
sentence. Id. Neely is inapposite because the record clearly 
indicates that Taylor was aware of the possibility of consecutive 
state and federal sentences. 
[30] Taylor also relies on United States v. Buchanan, 59_F-3d_91.4 
(9th Cir. 1955), to argue that the district judge's oral 
pronouncements must control. Buchanan held that where there is a 
direct conflict between a judge's 
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unambiguous oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment, the 
oral pronouncement must control, even if erroneous. Id. Here, there is no 
conflict between the district judge's oral and written pronouncements. 
[31] Taylor's final contention is that his attorney, at sentencing, 
provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. 
[32] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of sentencing 
counsel, Taylor must prove that his attorney's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that his 
attorney's error rendered the sentencing proceeding "unreliable" 
or "fundamentally unfair." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 5j06.yjS,v3_64, 
372 (1993); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
"Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of 
counsel does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural 
right to which the law entitles him." Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 372. A 
defendant is not entitled to relief unless "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466_U-S>__at__694. 
[33] Taylor argues that his counsel's performance was 
constitutionally deficient because his counsel (1) informed 
Taylor that his federal sentence would commence on May 10, 1993, 
(2) neglected to ensure that Taylor was in federal custody at the 
time his federal sentence was imposed, (3) failed to seek a 
continuance of Taylor's federal sentence pending his sentencing 
in state court, and (4) failed to move to vacate Taylor's plea. 
We reject all of these arguments. 
[34] To the extent that Taylor's counsel misadvised him about the 
commencement of his federal sentence, Taylor failed to show that 
this advice rendered the federal'sentencing proceeding 
"unreliable" or "fundamentally unfair." Taylor did in fact 
receive credit for time served before imposition of his federal 
and state sentences. He didn't receive the credit against his 
federal sentence, but he received credit against his state sentence. 
[35] The failure of Taylor's attorney to seek Taylor's transfer 
from state to federal custody prior to Taylor's federal 
sentencing did not fall below an objective standard of 
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reasonableness. A reasonable attorney could conclude that the 
state sentencing court that imposed the subsequent state sentence 
would properly deal with any issues arising from Taylor's federal 
and state sentences. 
[36] Counsel's failure to move for a continuance of Taylor's 
federal sentencing pending his state murder trial also did not 
likely fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(1) requires that a 
federal sentence "be imposed without unnecessary delay." Also, m 
the normal course of events, a federal district court lacks 
discretion to order a federal sentence to run concurrently with a 
state court sentence imposed after entry of the defendant's 
federal guilty plea. See Neely, 38 F.3d at 461. Thus, counsel's 
failure to move for a continuance of the May 10 sentencing 
hearing was not unreasonable. Moreover, Taylor has not 
established prejudice. No guarantee existed that the district 
court would have ordered the federal sentence to run concurrently 
with the state sentence. Indeed, when presented with this option, 
the district court rejected it. 
[37] Finally, counsel's failure to move to vacate Taylor's guilty 
plea was not objectively unreasonable. At the time Taylor entered 
that plea the only charges pending against him were federal charges. 
CONCLUSION 
[38] Because Oregon had primary jurisdiction over Taylor at the 
time of his federal sentencing, the district judge did not have 
the authority to commence the running of Taylor's federal sentence. 
Any comments by the district judge that could be interpreted as 
relating to the commencement of Taylor's sentence were mere surplusage 
and, thus, did not result in the denial of Taylor's due process rights. 
The Marshal properly returned Taylor to state custody, and Taylor did 
not receive constitutionally deficient 
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assistance of counsel, nor were the district court proceedings 
fundamentally unfair. 
[39] AFFIRMED. 
[fnl] The term "primary jurisdiction" in this context refers to 
the determination of priority of custody and service of sentence 
between state and federal sovereigns. Cf. United States v. 
Warren, 610F._2d680, 684 (9th Cir. 1980). A lack of "primary 
jurisdiction" does not mean that a sovereign does not have 
jurisdiction over a defendant. It simply means that the sovereign 
lacks priority of jurisdiction for purposes of trial, sentencing 
and incarceration. Id. at 684-85. 
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